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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
than that the collective agent appeared and purported to act for
him. It must appear that in some legally sufficient way he author-
ized it to act in his behalf." 14 The decision met with a storm of
protest from employers and unions alike, as well as from the
governmental agency charged with the administration of federal
legislation, and upon rehearing the decision was affirmed, but
in a modified form which recognized that "custom and usage
may be as adequate a basis of authority as a more formal au-
thorization for the union, which receives a grievance from an
employee for handling, to represent him in settling it ... .
Applying the test as thus formulated to the instant case, the
written request from the plaintiff to the union would seem to




In Board of Levee Commissioners v. Lacassin1 a motion had
been made to authorize the chief engineer of the Board of Levee
Commissioners to advertise for bids for a lease on certain prop-
erty owned by the board "for a period not to exceed one year."
A detailed lease proposal and a form of the proposed lease were
prepared containing an option to renew for two years.
The Supreme Court held that since the form of the lease
had been prepared by the board's employees, "any one who was
led to bid in accordance with all the terms contained in the form
of lease, had the right to expect that the Board would abide with
all of its provisions after acceptance of his bid."'2 In addition
the court stressed that, subsequent to the receiving of bids, the
board authorized its president to enter into a contract of lease
with the successful (and only) bidder "'in accordance with the
General and Special Specifications ... all in accordance with
his bid . . . which is hereby accepted .... ' ,,3 The court did not
14. Id. at 738.
15. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R.R. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661, 663 (1946).
* Member, Sanders, Miller, Downing, Rubin & Kean, Baton Rouge; Part-
time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 74 So.2d 52 (La. 1954).




discuss whether the bidder was entitled to place reliance on the
proposed lease form without examining the resolution which
authorized the making of the lease.
POLICE POWER
The growth of suburban communities and the advance of
scientific knowledge together create problems of a type unknown
in earlier and simpler days. The right of a city council to require
fluoridation of the city's water supply was presented in Chapman
v. City of Shreveport.4 Fluoridation was proposed for the alleged
primary purpose of reducing tooth decay in children twelve years
of age and under. The court held that if fluoridation of the water
supply bears any reasonable relation to the public health, it can
be undertaken by the city under the provisions of the Shreveport
home rule charter.5
The trial judge had concluded that fluoridation of the city
water supply was a matter within the realm of private dental
health and hygiene; the Supreme Court held that fluoridation of
water to prevent tooth decay is a matter of public health. The
court found no proof that fluoridation would cause serious ill
effects to the aged or ill. Neither was it arbitrary or unreasonable
to fluoridate the water when this would reduce the incidence of
disease only among a limited class. "A health measure is not
necessarily arbitrary because it affects primarily one class."6
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
In Olan Mills, Inc. of Tennessee v. City of Bogalusa7 a tran-
sient photographer wished to pursue her trade on behalf of her
Tennessee corporate employer in the City of Bogalusa. She was
arrested for violation of a municipal ordinance which required
itinerant vendors to furnish a $2,000 bond and to pay a $50
license fee for each solicitor. She did not offer a defense to her
criminal prosecution. Instead her employer sought by separate
action to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance "so as to restrain
interference with its business activities."
The Supreme Court found that there was an adequate rem-
edy for her in the criminal proceedings before the Bogalusa City
4. 74 So.2d 142 (La. 1954).
5. LA. CONST. Art. XIV, § 37.
6. 74 So.2d 142, 146 (La. 1954). The Ohio court of appeals has recently
sustained the power of the City of Cleveland to fluoridate its water. Kraus
v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 121 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio 1954).
7. 225 La. 648, 73 So.2d 791 (1954).
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Court. There all appropriate issues could be raised and litigated,
with a remedy by direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Indeed,
the court pointed out that, were it imperative to litigate the issue
in advance of violation, an action would lie for a declaratory
judgment.8 In addition there was no property right involved,
for there is no vested right to peddle. Therefore, the injunction
sought was denied.
PENSIONS
A fireman engaged in playing a stream of water on a fire
collapsed. Fifteen minutes later he died. The cause of death was
diagnosed as coronary arteriosclerosis and myocardial hyper-
trophy. The court found9 that the fireman was "killed" while
working at a fire within the meaning of the statutory provisions
governing the Firemen's Pension and Relief Fund for the City
of New Orleans.10 The court stated that it was not necessary
that death result solely from external violent, physical force to
entitle the family of the deceased to pension benefits; it sufficed
that there was a sudden death in which "the efficient or a con-
tributing cause of which is an accident occurring while he is
engaged in the performance of his duties as a fireman. .... ,
TEACHERS TENURE
Subsequent to a Supreme Court decision ordering reinstate-
ment of a Supervisor of Classroom Instruction, the school board
offered to employ the former supervisor as a classroom teacher,
at a salary equal to that which he had previously been paid.
The teacher accepted the offer, but filed suit for back pay from
the date for which he was last paid until the time of his re-
employment. He also sought reinstatement as Superintendent of
Classroom Instruction.
In State ex rel. Parker v. Vernon Parish School Board12 the
court recognized the dismissed teacher's right to back pay until
the time he was tendered reemployment. The court intimated
that a formal tender of employment may not be necessary, but
a definite and unequivocal offer must be made before the right
8. LA. R.S. 13:4231 et seq. (1950). The question was not raised whether
this suit could not be considered one for a declaratory judgment.
9. Sabathier v. Board of Trustees, 225 La. 31, 72 So.2d 1 (1954).
10. LA. R.S. 33:2114 (1950).
11. 72 So.2d 1, 3 (La. 1954).
12. 222 La. 91, 62 So.2d 111 (1952).
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to back pay ceases.13 The court found that "[t]he acceptance of
the position as classroom teacher by the relator renders the
question moot insofar as the position he now holds being com-
parable with that of Superintendent of Classroom Instruction.' 4
It might be argued that acceptance of reemployment does not
render questions of status moot. Since it is a duty of every liti-
gant to mitigate damages, a teacher might well be free to accept
the tendered reemployment without sacrificing a claim that it is
not of like status and equal standing with the position from
which he was dismissed. Of course, the right of the school board
on a reasonable and non-discriminatory basis to create and to
abolish positions as the educational and administrative needs of
the school system indicate is another matter, and this right need
not be inhibited by the Teachers' Tenure Statute.
LOCAL OPTION
Ward 4 of Caddo Parish contains the City of Shreveport.
In 1952 the unincorporated portion of Ward 4 sought and ob-
tained a local option election. A majority of the voters voted
"dry." A suit to have the election declared illegal followed. The
principal contention made was that the election was invalid
unless it was ward-wide, and that there is no authority in the
local option statute for an election dealing only with a portion
of a ward. In McGee v. Police Jury of Caddo Parish"5 the Su-
preme Court agreed with this contention, finding no statutory
authority for an election to be held in only the unincorporated
portion of a ward. It was of no moment that the City of Shreve-
port called and held a local option election at about the same
time as the election for the unincorporated part of the ward, for
the two elections did not present the same issue; the electors of
the City of Shreveport voted only on the question of municipal
prohibition and not on the issue of ward-wide prohibition.
EXPROPRIATION
In State v. Barineau'6 the Supreme Court affirmed the
amount of an award of damages made by the district court, find-
ing it sustained by the evidence. The court, however, pointed
out once again that the general statutory rule exempting the
13. State ex rel. Parker v. Vernon Parish School Board, 225 La. 297, 72
So.2d 512 (1954).
14. 72 So.2d 512, 513 (La. 1954).
15. 225 La. 471, 73 So.2d 424 (1954).
16. 225 La. 341, 72 So.2d 869 (1954).
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state and its agencies from the payment of court costs other than
stenographer's fees17 does not apply in expropriation proceedings.
"In these, the State is liable for costs, unless tender of the true
value of the land has been made .... To hold that the owner
must pay his own costs in resisting attempts to take his land
without his consent would nullify to a certain extent the con-
stitutional guarantee of just and adequate compensation." The
"'class of expenses usually taxed as costs should be included as
an element of the owner's damage.' ,18
A different sort of expropriation issue was presented when
the Police Jury of Lafayette Parish engaged in a program of
improving navigation in the parish. In order that a land dredge
used in this work along the Vermilion River might pass over a
land route, it became necessary to move telegraph lines owned
by Western Union Telegraph Company and extending across
the Vermilion River. The company alleged that it moved the
lines under protest and sought to recover as compensation the
amount spent for this purpose. Relying upon an exception of
no cause of action, the defendant set forth that the plaintiff's
construction permit required it not to obstruct the ordinary use
of the waters of the Vermilion River. The Supreme Court held
that, since the petition alleged that the telegraph line did not
obstruct ordinary use of these waters, the plaintiff should be
given an opportunity to prove its allegations. 9 The import of
the decision is that, if the telegraph lines permit ordinary use
of the stream crossed, it is not necessary that they also permit
work to improve the stream for navigation. Improvement of
navigation would then appear to be not an "ordinary use" in the
court's eyes. It is interesting to speculate whether maintenance
of existing navigation channels would constitute "ordinary use
. ..of the waters."
AssEssmvENr
In Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Baird2° the court applied
the statute which provides that, when the boundary lines of
parishes are in dispute, the parish lines as shown by "Hardee's
Map" of 1895 shall fix parish boundaries for tax assessment
purposes.21 Even were that map wrong, it was properly followed
17. LA. R.S. 13:4521 (1950).
18. 72 So.2d 869, 872 (La. 1954).
19. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Police Jury, 225 La. 531, 73 So.2d 450 (1954).
20. 225 La. 14, 71 So.2d 865 (1954).
21. LA. R.S. 47:1952 (1950).
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in making an assessment where the line between two parishes
was indefinite and uncertain and had not been fixed on the
ground. In such a case, the line is "in dispute under the mean-
ing of the statute," for the object of the statute was "to make
certain that the same property would not be assessed in two
parishes. '
22
DEDICATION TO PUBLIC USE
In Mecobon v. Police Jury of Jefferson Parish23 the court
applied the settled rule that intention to dedicate a plot of ground
to public use must be clearly established and found no dedica-
tion under the facts presented.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Melvin G. Dakin*
In Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Louisiana Public
Service Commission' the court found both "warrant in law" and
"warrant in the record" for commission action ordering a rail-
road to permit construction of a crossing of its right of way by
public authorities. The validity of the statute2 authorizing the
commission to require such construction was upheld against an
indirect challenge to its constitutionality as a taking of private
property for public purposes without just compensation in con-
travention of the Constitution. 3 Argument of counsel that the
railroad held its land in perfect ownership within Article 490 of
the Civil Code and could be deprived of it only by expropriation
was rejected in favor of the principle that "[i]mplicit in the
charter and franchise of the railroad company is the implied
condition that it is granted subject to the right of the State, in
the exercise of its police power, to establish and authorize new
works necessary and subservient to the convenience and safety
of its citizens which might cause damage to the property of the
railroad. To this end, the State has the power to require of the
railroad the uncompensated duty of constructing and maintaining
22. 71 So.2d 865, 868 (La. 1954).
23. 224 La. 793, 70 So.2d 687 (1954).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 224 La. 279, 69 So.2d 43 (1953).
2. LA. R.S. 45:841 (1950).
3. LA. CONST. Art. I, § 2.
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